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Summary  findings
The Brazilian  sugar and ethanol story goes like this:  Brazil  is an efficient  produccr of sugar,  but policy
Direct  market intervention  overrides  market forces.  intervention  has caused:
Markers  undergo dramatic  change.  Intervention  - Underproduction  of sugarcane.
establishes  vested interests. Rent-seeking  blocks  - The wrong mix of sugar and ethanol from cane (too
adjustment  to market change.  Economic  obicctives  much ethanol, not cnough sugar).
become blurred behind political  objectives.  Missed  opportunities to market  ethanol in high-
Opportunities  go begging.  Industry profitability  suffers.  value  uses (as an octane enhancer and clean fuel).
And national income is forgone.  *  Missed  opportunities to make the world sugar
Borrell, Bianco,  and Bale  use a simple economic  model  market more competitive.
of the Brazilian  sugarcane  sector and policy interventions  Adopting more market-based  policies  could be worth
to measure  the costs of existing  policies  and to develop  billions  of additional dollars annually  to Brazil.
better policies.
This paper - a product of the Latin America  and the Caribbean,  Country Department I, Natural Resources  and Rural
Poverty  Division  - is part of a larger  effort in the region  to analyze  economic  and sectoral  policies  in Brazil.  Copies  of the
paper arm  available  free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street  NW, Washington,  DC 20433. Please  contact Malcolm  Bale,
room Q7-167, extension 31913 (22 pages).  October 1994.
lhc  Policy ewarich  '  Pordibg  Paper  Scries  dismimts  the  rgs  of  zrc  k iiss  pmina to encotage  r  hc  exbange  of  s  bot
damlopment i  &An oeiuof  the  series  is  toget  tkefmdingsosstquidly,even  ifbe prc-sationsarc Zest*an  f[iypdsished.The
papers airy the aninss  of tb authors  and sboldd  be  used  and  cied  acodn*h.  The  s,bg  ixterpretarions, and  conduo  are  the
autbor'  own  and should  not  be  atcbwd to  the  World  Bank,  ;ItS  five Boar  of Dirctrors,  or  ay  of  its msember  countri
Produced  by the Policy  Research  Dissmination CenterBrazil's Sugarcane Sector
A Case of Lost Opportunity
Brent Borrell
Jose RP  Bianco
Malcolm D. Bale*
* Respectively,  Chief  Economist,  Ceere for  onal  EcDnomics,  Canberra,  Auswalia;  Chief
Economris;  Copeisxcr Uniio, Sio Paulo,  BAil  and Principal  Economist,  World Bank;  Washington,
DC,ULSAThe Brazil  sugar and ethanol  story is as  follows:  direct  government
intervention  overides market  forces, markets  undergo  dramatic
change,  intervention  establishes  vested interests, remt-seeking  blotks
adjustment  to market change, economic  objectives  become  blurred
behind  political objectives, opporunities  go begging, industry
profirabilily  suffers, and natonal income is  foregone. A simple
economic  model of the Brazilian  sugarcane  sector  and  policy
intervenions is used to measure the costs of eristing policies and to
develop  better  policies. Brazd is an efficient  producer.f sug-uar,  bu
policy intervention  causes: underproduction  of sugarcane,  the wrong
mix of sugar and ethanolfrom  cane (too much ethanol, not enough
sugar),  missed opportunities  to market ethanol  in high value  uses (as
an octane  enhancer  and clean  fuel), and missed opportunities  to make
the world  sugar market  more competitive. Adopnng  more  market
based  policies  could be worth billions of dollars  extra  to Brazl
annual>.
Setting the Scene
Brazil  has a clear comparative  advantage  in producing  sugarcane. It
is the most efficient  and largest  producer in the world, producing  a massive
230 million tons annuaUly. Brazil is also very efficient at converting  cane
into sugar,  yet only one third of its cane is used for sugar  production. The
rest is used to produce  ethanol  as a substitute  automotive  fuel. This is a poor
use of cane. The cost of producing  ethanol exceeds  the value  of fuel it
replaces. Brazil may, nonetheless,  have a comparative  advantage  producing
ethanol but only if it can market it as a product for higgher  valued  uses;
namely as an octane  enhancer  or as a clean fuel.  However,  current  policy
arrangements  stop  ethanol  being marketed  for alternative  uses. This paper is
about what is wrong  with existing  policies, what they might  be costing  Brazil
and what it needs  to do to develop  better policies.
But government  intervention  is blocking change
The oil price shocks  of the mid seventies  and early eighties  led to the
Brazilian  government's  PROALCOOL  program.  Through  this program  the
government  sought  to reduce  Brazil's reliance on imported  automotive  fuels
by promoting  the production  and use of ethanol through  direct  and indirect
subsidies  to ethanol  producers,  car manufacturers  and ehanol consumers.
The PROALCOOL  program  involves  set prices, directives  and quota
restrictions  which override  the forces of markets.
The PROALCOOL  program  was premised on the beliefs  that oil
prices would  remain  at the record highs of the 1970s;  that Brazil's  economy
was vulnerable  to shortages  of automotive  fuels; and th  sugar  prices would
remain low. Twenty  years later much has changed- Oil prices  have fallen-2-
and with them the value of ethanol  as a gasoline  substitute;  Brazil  has
discovered  significant  oil reserves  of its own  and established  high levels  of
domestic  fuel security;  sugar prices  are reasonably  attractive;  and the world
demand  for ethanol  as an environmentally  friendly  fuel is increasing.
Sugarcane  sector policy  has failed  to adapt  in order to take advantage  of this
new commercial  environment. The essential  instruments  of the
PROALCOOL  program have  remained  intact. The program has prevented
the natural  adjustment  which would  have  occurred  if Brazilian  producers  and
consumers  had faced  high oil prices. In other parts of the world  the solution
to high oil prices was high oil prices.
In the Brazilian  sugarcane  sector  diverse  commercial  decisions  abbut
resource  allocation  based on personal  incentives,  competition,  commercial
risk, and world market  prices  have  been swapped  for a few decisions  made
centrally,  by government  officials  far removed  from the realities  and
opportunities  of the market  and subject  to the rigidity's and non-commercial
objectives  of political  decision  making. Such  decision  making  has been
unsuited  to rapidly  changing,  uncertain  and increasingly  competitive
international  markets.
Through the PROALCOOL  program  many  manifestly  bad (though
well meant)  decisions  were made  and have  not been corrected. The ;ature of
intervention  has made  changing  the policy  highly  political. Without
government  intervention,  it is unlikely  that political  decisions  would have
overridden  good commercial  ones  and, if bad decisions  were made;
commercial  necessity  would  have  dictated  that they were soon corrected.
And economic objectives haye become politicized and the polky
confused
The main objective  of the PROALCOOL  program  was to reduce
Brazil's dependence  on expensive  imported  automotive  fuels in v.rder  to
increase  rational income. A secondary  objective  was to increase  flexibility
of the sugarcane  based sector  by giving  it an altermative  product  to produce.
However,  the government's  direct  intervention  froze producuon  patterns  and
reduces  national  income. As the economic  circumstances  and relative  prices
of oil, fuel and sugar markets  changed,  various  interest  groups sought  to
protect  their positions. Sugarcane  and ethanol  producers  sought  cost  of
production  pricing of ethanol  to protect  their investments  from the low world
oil price and owners  of ethanol  cars sought  to guarantee  cheap  supplies  of
fuel at prices not exceeding  those  of gasoline. Thus, rather than the program
changing,  new objectives  were found  to match  the policy  - the tail wags  the
dog.
Now, the most pressing  objective  is to maintain  the supply  of fuel to
ethanol  powered  cars at a price not exceeding  that of gasoline. This entails
subsidizing  both the production  and consumption  of ethanol. Meeting  this
obligation  is proving to be costly for Brazil  - it is not increasing national
income  as originally  intended. And ironicallyflexibility  to switch  bewn-3-
sugar and ethanol  is restricted  given the constraints  imposed  by this
obligation. The only economic  justification  given for the program  relates  to
an incidental  benefit  arising from cleaner  air.  But because  this is an
unintended  benefit,  there can  be no assurance  that the program  properly
targets the objective  of ensuring  clean  air nor that it achieves  it in the most
efficient  way. The govemment  now finds itself captive  to this increasingly
costly  program. Since 1986,  growth  in ethanol  production  has been  arrested
but production  has been maintained  in face of the adverse  movement  of
relative  prices  of oil and sugar  against  ethanol (figure 1).
Figure 1:  Alcohol  production  in Brazil  has plateaued  but not fallen
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Sourrc Borges  and  Bianco (1989).
Supply is managed wad pnces  are regulated
Quantitative  controls  and price setting  mechanisms  have  been  set up
under the program  to guarantee  the supply  of ethanol  and sugar  to the
domestic  market  and to keep the price of ethanol  to motorist  at acceptable
levels. The domestic  price of sugar and gasoline  are set in line with the
ethanol  price.  Exports  are restricted  until domestic  requirements  are met  and
pnces are controlled  so that consumers  are insulated  from world  prices  of
sugar  and fuels.
The main  institutions  involved  in administering  the policy  are:
*  SDR (Secretaria  do Desenvolvimento Regional) which estimates
domestic  sugar  requirements,  controls exports and gives  permission
for imports,  and restricts  entry by giving  permission  to build  new
units-4-
*  Ministry of Finance which sets prices biased  on the average cost of
production for producers and sets fuel prices to ensure costs of all
fuels to motorists are covered by the revenue received from motorists
*  DNC (Departwmento  Nacional de Combustdve) estimates  domestic
ethanol demand
*  PEIROBRAS which is the state owned distributor, marketer and
virtually exclusive importer of automotive fuels including ethanoL
Based on estimates of domestic sugar and ethanol demand production
quotas are set for all mills and distilleries by the SDR.  Only-  whin1 iesel
quotas are filled are mills and distileries entitled to export their over-quota
production. Export licenses are used to control exports. The production
quotas are set separately for two regions:  North/Northeast and
CentrallSouth; based on regional demands for each product.  A mill or
distllery which increases production for export in any one year has a high
proportion of that increase progressively switched to quota in subsequent
years and all other units have their quotas marginally decreased. So the
incentives for increasing production for export are gready diminished.
The other main instrument of policy is the price fLxing  arrangements.
To ensure ethanol quotas are filled ethanol prices to producers are set to
cover the cost of production of ehanol.  To reduce incentives to switch
sugarcane from ethanol to sugar, domestic sugar prices are also set in line
with the ethanol price and the costs of producing sugar.
Consumer prices for ethanol do not bear a direct reMonship  to
producer prices in the same way as sugar prices.  The monopoly  status of
DETROBRAS  makes this possible.  The consumer price of ethanoi is
influenced by the total cost to PET'ROBRAS  for refining and supplying all
automotive  fuels.  Generally profits on the sale of gasoline are used to
subsidize losses on other fuels.
Exports of sugar and ethanol receive the world prices less a fixed
export tax-currently  around 20 percent on the cane price or about 12 percent
on the domestic sugar price.  The export tax is based on a percentage of the
fixed cane price and so it does not vary with the world price of sugar or
ethanol.
Export licenses are used to remove the incentive to divert sugar or
ethanol to world markets when the world price of either product is above the
domestic price and before domestic requirements are meL  In most years
since 1985 world sugar prices have exceeded those of domestic  Brazian
sugar and ehanol  prices for producers.  The indicator world ethanol price
also appears to be above the Brazilian producer price for ethanol although the.
world ethol  market is small.  The imported oil price (measured in sugar
equivalents and adjusted for its efficiency advantage compared to ethanol) has-5-
been consistently  below the domestic  ethanol  fuel price through  the period
under review (1975  to present).
Consumer  prices are essendally  the same across the country,  varying
to some extent due to differing  costs of marketing. However  prces to
producers  reflect varying production  costs across the three main regions.
Two main policy interventions  are involved. In the case of sugar, an
18 percent tax is levied on sugar  producers  in the South, a nine percent tax is
levied  in the Central region  and no tax is levied on the higher cost  producers
in the North/Northeast. At the farm  gate the implicit  subsidy  is around
27 percent rather than 18 percent. In the case of ehnol  the taxing  and
cross-subsidization  takes place implicitly  through  PETROBRAS.  Apiirctase
price 18 percent higher is paid to producers  in the North Northeast  that in the
South  Central region and a nine percent  premium  is paid to producers  in the
Central region.
Assessing  the Impact of the Policy
The effects  of intervention  on the industry  and Brazil economy  depend
on a number  of important  industry  parameters. The economic  parameters  of
the sugarcane  sector reveal an industry  with:
*  a huge domestic  production  base;
W  joint products from a single  raw material;
*  flexibility  of production  between  those  products;
*  great international  competitiveness  in several  areas;
*  limited domestic  demand  for both products  in the long tern;
*  big international  opportunities  in both product markets;  and
*  considerable  policy intervention  affecting  all facets of the industry.
With a value added of around  $4.5 billion  annually,  the output  from
the sugarcane  sector makes up about 1.5 percent of Brazil's GDP and 15
percent of value added in Brazilian  agriculture. About one million  people  are
employed  directly  but the industry  is highly  capital  intensive  (see figure  2).
Despite  the sector's agricultural  base' the industry  is not an intensive  user of-6-
Figure 2:  The sugarcane  sector is big
Two thirds of sugarcane  is used  for ethanol and ethanol production  is
dominated  by the southern  and central regions
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land with returns  to land being less than 15 percent. The industry  is not
highly reliant  on fixed factors  like many  other agricultural  industries  which
suggests  it may be highly supply  elastic.
The industry  is distributed  across three main regions with  around 60
percent of production  in the South in the state  of Sao Paulo. Brazilian  sugar
production  represents  about 8 percenit  of world production. Ethanol
production  makes  up nearly a third of Brazil's automotve fuels supply. In
1991/92  nearly 85 percent or 7.2 million  tons of sugar was absorbed
domestically  and the rest was exported.
.Very  little ethanol is exported. Larger  amounts  were exported  to ¶the
United States  until 1986  when the United States  imposed  hefty  tariffs  on
ethanol imports. Brazil produces  five grades of sugar. The cristal especial
is the main form of sugar produced  in the South  and is of equal  quality to the
refined  sugar produced  in some other countries. Refined  sugar  generally
trades at a premium  to raw sugar.
Two types  of ethanol  are produced: Anhydrous  and hydrous. Over
eighty percent  is hydrous. This is intended  as a fuel substitute  for gasoline
while anhydrous  ethanol  is an additive  to gasoline  and an octane  enhancer.
The production  of anhydrous  ethanol  is slighdy more involved  and slightly
more costly.
In 1991192  there was a total of 376 industrial  plants  processing
sugarcane. Nearly  half were sugar mills with annexed  ethanol  distilleries
These plants  produced  about 75 percent of the sector's value  added  -
virtually  all its sugar  and 60 percent of the ethanol.
The  joint production  of sugar  and ethanol  provides  a distinct  synergy.
Because  of the alternative  uses for sugarcane  juice after cooking,  only high
quality  juice needs  to be retained for sugar maldng. This joint product
characteristic  reduces  sugar  production  costs and increases  sugar  quality.
Indeed, the sugar  produced  is similar  to refined  sugar whereas  normally
sugar mills produce  raw sugar which has higher levels  of impurities  and
requires refining. This sugar commands  a premium  on the domestic  and
international  markets. The impurities  which are passed  on to the ethanol
making  process  do not impose  costs in a way they would  if left  in during
sugar making.
Joint production  potentially  also provides  production  and marketing
flexibility  which  could provide  various managerial,  marketing  and operational
advantages. To some extent  this flexibility  will depend  on the extent of
surplus  capacity  available  in each  process and the marginal  cost of additional
capacity. Given  the large economies  of scale reported  for both processes,  it
is likely that the marginal  cost of additional  capacity-especially  at the time of
construction-is  low.  Presently  there is around 35 percent  additional  capacity
in milling  and 25 percent in distilleries  across the industry. Further, to the
extent that the joint product  operation  of an annexed  mill allows  the higher-8-
total sugarcane  throughput  than would  be the case for a stand-alone  mill--
especially  given the advantages  afforded  by its flexibility-there  may be
economies  of scale in crushing  and cooking.
Brml  is an efficient sugar producer and could easily expand
Brazil has a vast supply  of arable flat land in the Center  South  which
give the region the flexibility  to increase  and decrease  sugarcane  and sugar
production  with changes  in prices over the medium  to long-term--see  box 1.
The Center-South  has a number  of advantages  over the North/Northeast.
The World  Bank (1989)  attributes  the advantages  of the Center-South  over
the North/Northeast  to superior  climate,  topography  and technology.:
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And Brazil's sugar  producing  potential could influence world
pnce
Although  most of Brazil's sugar is absorbed  domestically,  it is the
world market  price of sugar that sets the opportunity  cost of that output  to
the Brazilian  economy. And among  commodity  markets,  the world  sugar
market  is the most volatile. It is destablished  by the protectionist  sugar
policies  of many other countries.
The average  world  price of sugar since 1951, in 1990  values, is
US$18.4cIlb. The average  price for the decade 1981-90  is US$11.6cllb.
This is about double the Brazilian domestic producer price.
Despitre  changes occurring  in the market, intermittent  peaks and large
troughs  are likely to cuntinue,  although  extreme highs  and lows  are less
likely (Borrell  and Duncan 1990). Any trade negotiation  which made  OECD
sugar producers  and consumers  more responsive  to the world  price would
help stabilize  the market (Bale  and Lutz).  However,  there is little optimism
that trade liberalization  will occur quickly. So Brazil's producers  and
consumers  must be flexible  in order to cope with the risks arising from-9-
instability  in the world rnarket. But because  changes  in Brazil's sugarcane
sector  policies  have  the potential  to release  great amounts  of sugar  on to the
world  market,  Brazil  also has the potential  to influence  the world  price and
needs  to consider  how it uses this influence  to best effect.
Estimates  of export demand  elasticities  provide  a measure  of the
impact  an increase  in exports  of a product  could  have  on world  price'.
Borrel  (1991)  estimates  Brazil's  price elasticity  of export  demand  at
between  -3.0 and -14.0.  Under the most  likely  set of assumptions  and
assuming  efficient  policies,  the estimate  is around  -9.0.  One  interpretation  of
this is for a one percent increase  in Brazil's  exports  the world  price  would
decline  by 0.11 percent (Houck  1965). Although  this degree.of  influbncb
seems insufficient  to allow Brazil  to affect  the world  price to its advantage,
the vast  amounts  of sugar Brazil  could  potentially  divert  to the world  market
(perhaps  an increase  in excess  of 500%)  would  have  a big impact  on the
world  price. Arother finding  of Borrell  is that because  of Brazil's  potential
impact  on the world market,  it has the potential  to reduce  world  price
variability. This has significant  policy  implications  that will  be discussed
later.
The price of gasoline  determines  the value of ethanol  -- or does i?
Since  ethanol  is being used  as a substitute  for gasoline,  its value
should  be assessed  relative  to the cost of the gasoline  it displaces.  Presently
the imported  price of oil plus refining  cost  is around $25 to $29 per barrel.
Ethanol,  meanwhile,  costs around  $40 per barrel to produce  in the Center-
South  and around  18 percent  more in the North/Northeast,  in energy
equivalent  terms. The net contrbution  of ethanol  to the Brazilian  economy
appears  to be.  highly  negative.
But ethanol  has other product  attributes  which may make  its potential
value  to the economy  greater  than its value  as a fuel substitute. Present
policies  force  ethanol  to be marketed  as a fuel substitute. In the absence  of
these  policies  it could  be marketed  to exploit  more fully  its other  attributes.
Its attibutes include:
*  a torque  advantage  which  may  compensate  for its lesser  efficiency
than  gasoline  and which  could  mean  a smaller  ethanol  engine  could  be
used  in place  of a gasoline  engine
*  an exhaust  emission  advantage  as alcohol  cars produce  57 percent  less
crbon monoxide,  64 percent  less hydrocarbons,  13  percent  less
nitrogen  oxides  and no lead  emissions  compared  to gasoline  engines
(World  Bank, 1989)
1  There  are many  problems  with making  estimates  of export  elasticities  of demand  (sue
Orvutt  1950)  and  there  are good reasons  for believing  most estimates  ovastas the
impacL-10-
*  unlike fossil fuels which add carbon dioxide to the atmosphere,
ethanol only recycles it as next year's crop of sugarcane absorbs
carbon dioxide emissions from ethanol burned last year
*  anhydrous ethanol can be used as an octane enhancer and contains
about twice as much oxygen by weight as other competing
oxygenates.
The undistorted demand for ethanol could be affected by all these
factors, and there is primafaci  evidence at least, that international demand is
fairly elastic and strong relative to Brazil's long term domestic demand.
Exhaust emission control standards are tightening in many parts of te' wbrld
and carbon taxes have been imposed in some countries (Finland, Netherlands
and Sweden) and are being discussed in others (countries of the European
Union).  ALready  40,000 barrels of ethanol are consumed daily in the United
States as octane enhancers or uxygenates and the total daily US demand for
oxygenates is 190,000 barrels.  This consumption approximately  equals
Brazil's daily output of ethanol.  Indeed, Brazil once  exported 300,000 to
700,000 liters a year to the United States, but the volume of all ethanol
exports fell dramatically when the US imposed tariffs on ethanol in  1986.
lhe 'United  Stares also heavily subsidizes the production of ethanol which
reduces US import demand and may lower the world price, although it is
also likely that the price and relative efficiency of other oxygenates sets the
price of etlhanol.
There are many unknowns about the world demand for ethanol and  '
oxygenates more generally.  Not only do tariffs such as those in the United
Sates distort the market but Brazil's marketing restrictions prevent it
effectively developing the market.  Further, because the demand is relatively
new, there is a range of views about the merits and economics of various
oxygenates which have not been widely tested in undistorted markets.  What
is clear is that ethanol is likely to be more valuable as a value-adding
component of fuel than as an outWight  substitute for gasoline, and Brazil is a
low cost producer of ethanol relative to the United States.
And  costs of producing ethanol are falling
Costs of ethanol production have fallen 20 percent since the
PROALCOOL program began.  Recall that the average cost of production in
the Center-South is around $40 per barrel.  An altemative view on the costs
of production is that reported in Rask (1992).  He uses a social cost-benefit
analysis based on shadow prices for all inputs and outputs after correcting for
tariffs and quotas, interest subsidizes, distortions in the labor market and
overvaluation  of exchange rate.
Rask finds that the resource cost to Brazil of producing ethanol in the
Center-South region were between $18 and $22 per barrel in 1987 and
between $48 and $55 in the North/Northeast.  Based on his findings ethanol
would be a viable alternative to gasoline in the Center-South.  His analysis-11- 
suggests that the distortions in the economy discriminate strongly against the
sector and that in a more liberal open trading economy, the compettiveness
of ethanol (and sugar) would be enhanced.
But the short-term demandfor  ethanol is fairly  tight
About a third of Brazil's fleet of ethanol cars run on alcohol while the
others run on a gasohol blend with 22 percent ethanol and 78 percent
gasoline.  To some extent this locks brazil's  demand for ethanol, at least over
the life of these vehicles.  However, there is some flexibility in demand by
blending different types of fuel - in particular methanol can be used in place
of ethanol.
Methanol can be imported more cheaply than ethanol can be produced
for in Brazil.  So substituting methanol for ethanol lowers the cost of
supplying alcohol fuel.  However, there seems to remain a political
preference for ethanol.  Cane growers in particular are concerned that while
switching sugarcane to sugar production and to exports of sugar might
increase their returns, if the world price  of sugar fell they may not be free to
switch back to the domestic ethanol market.
An Economic Model of the Sugarcane  Sector
A four subsector model of the industry is constructed and the
econonic  parameters and policy instruments of the sector can be represented
as shown in figure 3.  Prices in the graph are shown in sugar equivalent
terms.  The four panels represent the four main markets afficting the sector.
Because of the predominance of the Center South, Brazil has a large
and elastic supply of sugar or ethanol.  This  is represented in panel one.
Although the supply curve is used to represent both products, at the margin it
probably represents the product in which Brazil has the greatest comparative
advantage:  sugar.  Panel one also shows that there is a small domestic
demand for sugar relative to the total supply potential.
In panel two the short and long term demand for domestic ehanol is
represented.  The short term demand is shown as inelastic because of the
limited options of owners of ethanol powered cars to switch to alternative
fuels and considering that ethanol is simply demanded as a fuel.  The long
term demand is more elastic and represents the fact that there are many
substitute fuels for consumers given time to switch.  The positioning of the
long term variant reflects the fact that past policies have promoted the sale of
ethnol  cars.  This has added greatly to the proportion of ethanol  cars in the
nation's fleet.  Without these Doicies the proportion of etanol  cars would
decline.  Further, without existing marketing arrangements the nature of
demand for ethanol could change from demand for a substitute for gasoline to
a demand for ethanol for other purposes such as an octane enhancer. 1-12-
The displacement  of the horizontal  axes of panels two and three is to
talce  account  of the fact that Brazil's comparative  advantage  lies in sugar
production. So sugar equivalent  prices  for ethanol must be higher than sugar
prices  to make  producers indifferent  to supplying  either commodity.
Panels three and four represent,  respectively,  the world ethanol and
world  sugar markets.
Presently the domestic  sugar  and ethanol  prices to producers (DP) are
set by government  below the world  prices (WP)  for these products. At DP a
quantity  of sugar and ethanol  equivalent  in sugar terms to C is produced. An
amount  of sugar L4qual to A is consumed domestically.  A quantity B bf  !-
etanol is consumed  domestically  and C-A-B  of sugar is exported  to the
world market. Although  gasoline  could be purchased  by Brazil at the price
GP, the govemment's arrangement  to buy ethanol at DP guarantees  the sales
of ethanol  producers at the set price.
It is assumed there are no ethanol  exports. The equilibrium  world
price needed  to absorb Brazil's sugar  exports  is WP.  Without  government
intervention  in the domestic  sugar  and ethanol  markets  world prices for both
products  would dominate the domestic  market  and over the long term the
demand  for ethanol would shift from D'  to D.  However,  this would  result
in a change  in the allocation  of sugarcane  between  sugar  and ethanol as well
as some  increase in production  and exports. The increased  exports would
impact  negatively  on the world  price and a new equilibrium  would be
established  at WP', C', B', and C'-A'-B'-D, where D represents  the exports
of ehanol that would emerge. Although  the world prices of both ethanol  and
sugar  would al., Brazil would  be better off to the extent of the shaded  areas
in the first two panes.
The first shaded area is the extra income earned  by producers  from
higher  prices and increased  production,  but net of the loss of income to
consumers  of sugar due to the higher  prices.- The second shaded area
represents  the amount Brazil could have  on its fuel b.ill  if the government  did
not underwrite  the purchases of ethanol  at the set price.  The third shaded
area is the extra which consumers  would  have  to pay for the ethanol they
continued  to use and represents  a reduction  in income. Nonetheless,  the net
result is likely to be a large net increase  in income to the Brazilian  economy.
The shaded areas relating  to the rest of the world are the benefits  to
consumers  of sugar and ethanol  due to lower  prices, after allowing  for the
decrease  in income to sugar and ethanol  producers  in the rest of the world
due to lower prices they would receive.Figure 3:  Brazil's Sugarcane  Industry  Policies are Costly to Brazil
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Although it would appear from the model that existing sugarcane
sector policy is costly to Brazil, there is an important welfare effect missing.
This is the incidental environmental benefit which current policy affords:
cleaner air.  There is also a positive extemnal  benefit to the world not
included in the model.  This is the reduction in carbon dioxide emissions into
the atmosphere from using ethanol instead of a fossil fuel such as gasoline.
This is a benefit for which Brazil deserves but does not receive credit
because it is not part of a deliberate policy.
Under the new equilibrium world price derived in the model, more
ethanol is produced in and exported from Brazil and worldwide, although
domestic consumption of ethanol drops.  To the extent that this would replace
fossil fuels, Brazil's current set of policies might be argued to be holding
back this environmental benefit and therefore imposing a cost on the global
economy.  Moreover, to the extent that the world demand for ethanol
reflected the carbon neutral attribute of ethanol, it would be reflected in the
prce  of ethanol and so allow Brazil to internalize some of the benefits of this
attibute.  Whether the change in policies would cause an increase or a
decrease in ethanol production is an empirical question.  So whether existing
policies provide more or less of this environmental benefit is also an
empirical  question.
The  economic  model  reveals more
Setting the domestic price for sugarcane based products below the
world price for either one of these products lowers producers' incentive to
produce sugarcane, sugar and ethanol.  Overall output is less than it should
be.  In the model it slb  rather than C.  Further, the controlling of
prices for both products on the dbmestc market combined with the use of
production quotas distorts the mix of ethanol and sugar and the allocation of
those products between the various domestic and world markets.  In the
model  proportionally  more sugar and less ethanol should  be produced  and
more of both products should be exported.  Brazil is paying too much for its
automotive fuels and is consuming too much ethanol.
In addition US tariffs on ethanol reduce the capacity of world trade to absorb
some of Brazil's sugarcane.  Consequently it is redirected to sugar production
so lowering the world price of sugar - see figure 4 where the world price is
reduced from WP- to WP" due to the US trade restrictions against ethanol
imports.
But the model does not reveal everthing
*  Quantitative controls over exports unnecessarily limt  incentives for
producers to develop ethanol markets.  Creative marketing of ethanol
by competing private firms is stifled because domestic distibution  and
marketing is controlled by a monopoly state enterprise and supplies
for exports are unreliable due to the priority to satisfy domestic
demand  firsL-15-
*  Brazil has little idea of the value  of its ethanol until it uses
international  markets  to test its worth.
*  Despite  Brazil's well established  reputation  as an efficient  producer  of
sugarcane  and sugar, cost of production  pricing for ethanol  and sugar
insulates  producers  from competitive  forces that would  provide
incentives  to innovate  and seek even lower costs  of production. There
is considerable  variability  in productive  efficiency  of industrial  units
processing  cane.
*  Quotas  on production  and restrictions  on building  new facilities  may
reduce incentives  for adoption  of international  best practices;i  A
potential  new owner of a facility may  be discouraged  b  such
restrictions  because  it may make the adoption  of new technology  less
profitable.
*  There are differences  in supply  potential  and fixed  prices  between  the
North/Northeast  and the Center-South. Because  of the lesser
competitiveness  of the North/Northeast,  it may not have the potential
for expansion  that the country  has as a whole.
*fi  Brazil has invested  a great deal of resources  developing  ethanol  engine
technology  for a small  domestic  market rather than borrowing
technology  from others. This has added to the costs of the automotive
industry. Moreover,  economies  of scale in vehicle  production  have
been lost by the need to produce  three types of engines  for many
models.
Measuring the Cost and Benefits of the Policy
To measure  the broad  impacts  of Brazil's sugarcane  sector  policies  we
developed  a computable  simulation  model embodying  those  feature of the
graphical  model outlined  in figure 3.  One exception  to figure  3 is that the
world ethanol market  is not explicitly  modelled. More research  is required
to define  the dimensions  of this market before  it cani  be meaningfully
represented. Instead  it is considered  implicit. Essentially  the existence  of
the world ethanol market  can be regarded as making  the export demand  for
Brazil's sugarcane-based  products  more elastic. As seen in figure 3,
competitive  market behavior  will ensure  prices are equated  between  the sugar
and ethanol markets  in sugar  equivalents  terms.  The export  demand
elasticity  is made about 10 percent more elastic  to accommodate  this.
The model  is broadly  representative  of the sector  in 1992. The
parameters  and prices for the model  are based on those discussed  in previous
sections. The model  is used to simulate  mariket  outcome  under free trade and
to compare these with simulated  outcomes  under existing  policies. The
results  provide a measure  of the long term impact of the policy  and not the
short-term  effects.Figure.4:  US Ethanol  Tariff Lowers the World Sugar.and Ethanol.Prices
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The results  reveal  that:
*  existing  policy  costs Brazil  between  $660m  and $2500m  a year;
*  Brazil is producing:
too little sugarcane;
- too much ethanol for the domestic market;
- not enough  sugar  and possibly  ethanol  for export
*  exports  of sugar  could expand  dramatically  from  around  3 million
tons  a year to over 20 million  tons, making  Brazil  by far ih  dominant
exporter;
*  Brazil's  exports  could markedly  lower the world  price for sugar;
*  world  price would  fall toward  the existing  Brazi  pnrce;
*  under  some  scenarios  world  price falls  by nearly  50 percent;
e  nonetheless,  price remains  higher han the exisdng  Brazilian  price by
a sufficient  margin  to induce  a marked  supply  response  under  most
scenarios.
The large impact  Brazil's expanded  exports  have  on the world  price
raises the issue of whether  export  taxes or other controls  over  exports  could
be applied  to raise the world  price and Brazil's export  revenue. In practice
to operate  such  a policy  requires  having good information  about  export
demand. There  are serious  difficulties  in accurately  estimating  the nature  of
demand. Policy  markers  therefore  cannot  intervene  successfully  to ensure
that the benefits  of their intrvention will exceed  the costs  (Helpman  1990).
What is more, the intervention  makes the industry  vulnerable  to political
intervention.
Within  the range of estimated  welfare  effects,  the higher  ones occur
when a reasonably  optimistic  but not unrealistic  scenario  is assumed  about
world  price were Brazil  to leave  its policy unchanged. This scenario  is
roughly  consistent  with the World  Bank's latest long term  projection  of the
world sugar  price at around  13c/lb. It also assumes  that Brazil's  marina
impact  on the world market  price diminishes  with bigger  and bigger  increases.
in the levels  of Brazil's  exports  (a constant  export  elasticity  of demand  is
assumed). The lower  numbers  in the range occur assuming  the long run
outlook  the world  prce is for it to stay similar  to its present  hitDrical low of
9cIlb. Another  crucial  assumption  affecting  the lower  range  figure  is that
each additional  unit of exports  lowers  the world  price by a constant  amount  -
a point  elasticity  is applied  to a large change.
What  the numbers  do not include are the environmental  benefits  of
ethanol. Were  the European  Commuity to  ith pls  imm  ato-  - t-18-
$70 per ton tax on carbon, one way  of evaluating  the carbon neutral  attnbute
of ethanol would be to assume this magnitude  of saving for every ton of
carbon emission  ethanol displaces. After  allowing  for the fossil fuels used up
in the production  of ethanol, Macedo  (1992)  has estimated  ethanol provides
saving  in emissions  of just under 10 million  tons of carbon annually  in
Brazil. Valued  at $70 per ton, a saving  of $660 million  a year is derived.
A change  in policy could lead  to either a reduction or an increase  in
ethanol  production. Too litdte  is known  about  the world ethanol market  to
make a judgement on the likely outcome. Further, other benefits,  such as the
health benefits  deriving from reduced  toxic  emissions  add to the social  worth
of the policy but remain unquantified.
The model helps highlight the majorproblem:  policy rigidity
As long as Brazil sugarcane  policy maintains  restrictions  which
prevent  producers responding  to the market  opportunities,  it is likely to
produce sub-optimal  outcomes  for the sector. The net social worth of the
policy is sensitive  to the outlook  for sugar, oil and ethanol prices about
which there are many different  plausible  scenarios. The outlook  currendy
suggests  that a continuation  of existing  policy  would  be costly  for Brazil.
But regardless of the price outlook,  the policy  is still sub-optimal. The
problems  is that policy rigidity removes  all inzentive  or capacity  to respond
to changing  market circumstances  whatever  they may bring.
The state monopoly  which  r.cevents  private marketing  of ethanol,  the
production  quotas, the export licenses,  and the state fixed prices all play a
part in adding to a sub-optimal  outcome. The model indicates  that the costs
of the policy are large and that if there  are benefits  they are incidental  rather
than deliberate. Not only do these policies  prevent  the sugarcane-based
sector from adjusting, they make  it vulnerable  to political  interference  by
creating  incentives  for renlt  seeking. This exposes  the sector to the
uncertainties  of politics, the end result of which  is to increase  the commercial
risks and costs of the sector.
A policy is required which allows  Brazil's sugarcane  sector to adapt
to any set of market circumstances  as well  as allowing  ethanol to compete  as
an environmentally  safe fuel additive. Until mechanisms  are put in place to
exploit  the opportunities  of changing  markets  and to use ethanol to achieve
explicitly  acknowledged  environmental  targets,  existing  policy should  be
prsumed to be highly costly.
Getting Brazil's Policy Right
The objecves  of government  toward  the sugarcane  based sector
should  be clean: to maximize  the income  from the production  and sales of
sugarcane  based products and to ensure  that as part of an integrated
environmental  policy, the environmentally  friendly  attibutes of ethanol can
be fully exploited  domestically  and internationally.  But, explicit  policy-19-
objectives  for the sugarcane based sector should not specify  the role of
ethanol in meeting environmental targets or benefits. This should be part of
a separate  environmental policy if necessary.  Brazil's sugarcane sector and
environmental  policies must be entirely independent  so that objectives are
clearly defined.
Rather, policies should allow markets to work
Although a case might be made for intervention  to achieve
environmental  targets under Brazil's environmental policy, no case can be
made for an interventionist sugarcane sector policy.  The strongest argument
for direct government intervention in the sector relates to Brazil's huge  t.
potential  to impact the world price of sugar.  But as previouslj discussed
intervention  is not practical and it is more likely to be costly than successful.
The challenge  is how to allow unfettered markets for sugar and ethanol to
function  efficiently. This will require:
a  removing all production quotas;
allowing the unhindered private marketing  of ethanoL
domestically and intemationally.
Both these changes would make the fixing of prices redundant and
leave private  producers free to determine the proportons of sugar, ethanol
and by-products  they wish to produce and privately market  Domestic sales
and export taxes could continue to be applied but only as a revenue raising
exercise. The tax should not be applied in deliberate manner to raise the
world price.  Such taxes may be the most efficient ways  to tax the sector.
Regional subsidies provided by sales tax exemptions  are not an
efficient  way to achieve regional or welfare objectives. All exemptions
should be lifted.  Moreover, with a freeing up of the market and a shift from
fixed prices to the world prices, the evidence is that domestic  producer prices
would rise even in the North/Northeast.  So higher world prices would likely
compensate  for the loss of tax privilege and may indeed more than
compensate. Continuation of the subsidy would lead to the wrong mix of
production  between the North/Northeast and the Center-South  regions.
Should the govemment wish to continue to provide support  to the North/
Northeast  region as part of its broader economic strategy, well targeted
supports  should be provided which do not interfere with producers' incentives
to produce  sugarcane based products.
And Brazil could be proactive in improving international  markets
Of all the initiatives the Brazilian sugarcane based industries could
take to reduce protectionism in sugar industries in the rest of the world, the
most influential  would be to let others in the market know how willing and.
capable  it is of producing more sugar and ethanol at a highly competitive
price.  In the past, Brazil has concealed its competitiveness.  By operatng a-20-
system  of production  controls  it has sent  a message  to the rest of the world
that it is not prepared  to cater to that market  and supply  more sugar  at world
prices.  Countries  needing  more sugar  have  taken  it into their own  hands  to
supply  that sugar  adopting  whatever  polices  are veeded  to help and encourage
their growers,  who invariably  are less efficient  than Brazilian  growers.
The Brazilian  government  may wish  to bolster such an initiative  by
devoting  more resources  toward  publicizing  and demonstrating  the
competitive  strengths  of its sugarcane  based  sector. The industry  could
sponsor  and promote  studies  on sugar  and ethanol  trade which.reveal  the cost
to foreign  consumers  and domestic  producers  of interntionists  policies. By
standing  ready to supply  the world market  with low-cost  sugar, BruiL  will
raise the cost  of these  policies  to interventionist  counties.  Brazil,  as a
member  of the Cairns  group, plays  an active  role in GATIT  and has made
itself visible  through  the Uruguay  Round. It may need  to make  itself more
visible on sugar  and ethanol  trade issues.
urthter,  environmental poEicy  should recognize ethanol's
attibutes
As part of its broader  environmental  policy,  Brazil  needs  to attempt  to
quantify  the health  and environmental  benefits  of ethanol  and develop  a
separate  and explicit  policy to ensure  it makes  the most of those  benefits.
BRut  should policy reforms be phased?
Two  main arguments  have been  advanced  for why Brazil  should-  move
slowly  on reforms.
S  There  are so many ethanol  cars that letting  the market
determine  ethanol  prices  will greatly  force up the price
of fuel to consumers,  reduce  the demand  for ethanol
and leave  existing  ethanol  powered  cars underutilized.
*  The impact  on the world  sugar  price wvould  be too great
if Brazil  moved  immediately  to reform.
If the same taxes  were levied on ethanol  as on gasoline  and the
market  was left to determine  ethanol  prices,  the ehanol price is licely to rise
in line with its costs  of production  and with the price of sugar on the world
market. Demand,  however,  is not likely  to change  greatly. In the short
term, consumers  are locked  into buying  ethanol  as a fuel and registered
ethanol  powered  cars  are likely to be discounted  on the second  hand market
to reflect the premium  of the ethanol  price over gasoline. The demand  for
new  ethanol  cars may diminish. However,  if cheap  methanol  is freely
imported  and blended  with ehanol, this may  well moderate  the price rise in
ethanol. What  is more, it appears  that the current  price discount  of ethanol
to gasoline  to reflect  its lesser efficiency  as a fuel maybe  overestimated.
Many  consumers  may  well continue  to have  a preference  for ethanol  powered-21-
cars given its torque advantage,  environmental  friendly  attributes  and its
greater  efficiency  in new cars.
The continuing  demand  for ethanol in the short to medium  term from
motorists  will raise the price of ethanol  enough to limit the extent to which
mills with annexed  distilleries  will switch  cane from ethanol  to sugar.  So the
.. amount  of additional  sugar produced  for export will be only a small
proportion  of what could be produced  in the long term. Moreover,  mills
with annexed  distilleries  are limited  in their capacity  to switch  cane in the
short term to 3 million  tons of additional  sugar. Beyond  this, new capacity
weuld need to be built.  Commercial  risk is likely to.moderate  the speed at
which new  capacity  is installed. It may take a very long time-before  enouigh
capacity  is developed  to absorb the majority  of sugarcane  produced  in Brazil.
During  this time world consumption  for sugar  will continue  to grow.  This
growth  will help absorb Brazil's additional  sugar and help moderate  declines
in the world  price of sugar caused  by Brazil's additional  exports.
So, it is not clear that the cost of fuel will rise by the full amount of
the increase  in the ethanol price due to methanol  substitution,  that ethanol
demand  will be highly disrupted  in the short to medium  term, or that Brazil
will move  immediately  to switch  vast quantifies  of cane to sugar for export
Change  will tend to phase itself without  any deliberate  need  for phasing.
Politicay  it may be considered worthwhile phasing in full taxes on ethanol
as a concession  to effianol  car owners  who bought expecting  prices to be
controlled.-22-
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